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Abstract 
IT governance, like global governance of projects, requires 
cooperation between several actors. In general, such cooperation 
builds a collaboration network between entities. Many works in 
the literature interested in collaboration network, but no one of 
them were focused directly on how to build a network in an IT 
governance perspective. In this paper, we investigate how game 
theory can be exploited to provide a formal implementation of 
Cost Management Process, while highlighting Actor-Network as 
a framework of collaboration and its incentive stage as a key 
step for network construction. Our objective is to propose an 
approach of network establishment, by inciting actors through 
cost savings. For that, we use Shapley Value to answer the 
question: For the sake of IT governance, which coalitions are 
likely to form in order to ensure best cost-saving objectives in 
ANT mode of collaboration? A graphical tool is developed also 
to visualize and simulate networks evolution. 
Keywords: Collaboration Network, Actor Network Theory, 
Cost-Sharing, Cooperative Game theory, Shapley Value, COBIT 
5, IT System Governance. 
1. Introduction 
IT governance is a business function that relies on people 
to manage technological resources. Therefore, it is 
susceptible to the games they play and their consequences 
[6], as it happens during bargaining and cost sharing 
negotiations. In order to take advantage of their benefits, 
companies must promote the adoption of concepts and 
methods that favor the effective use of technological 
resources [5]; they are looking to best practice frameworks 
such as COBIT to improve the quality of their IT 
governance.  
 
 
On another side, collaborative network has become a key 
enabler for trading success and economic growth. Within 
IT governance, cooperation takes different forms, from 
simple information exchange, to business processes 
interoperability among independent enterprises [6] [11], 
and also in term of cost-sharing. In fact, independent 
businesses become able to collaborate in order to have 
benefic results for all [2]. 
In this paper we investigate how IT governance can benefit 
from the use of game theory to implement Costs 
Management process. The Literature review shows that so 
far no publication has addressed this subject directly. 
Therefore, connecting game theory to IT governance 
seems to be an open road for research and publication [1] . 
In our context we use Shapley value [10] as a fair cost 
sharing solution to divide costs between actors involved in 
IT project, relative to their marginal contributions. 
We introduce Actor-Network Theory (ANT) [3], [4] as a 
framework of collaboration which helps us make sense to 
interaction evolution between different actors of business 
network. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents a review of IT governance initiatives with Game 
Theory. Section 3 presents the different concepts and 
theories used. Section 4 introduces the proposed 
cooperative network building game. Section 5 presents 
numerical application that calculates shared-cost between 
actors using Shapley Value in a realistic Actor-network 
context via a developed java platform. Finally, Section 6 
concludes this paper. 
 
 2. IT Governance Vs Game Theory - 
Literature Review 
We provide in this section a brief literature review of game 
theory as a support in IT governance initiatives. In a 
Systematic literature Review [1] six papers was selected to 
aid the implementation of relevant aspects of governance 
using game theory. For example, the use of game theory to 
support the governance of common resources is 
approached in [27]. The prevention of environmental 
accidents and increasing readiness for action in the 
aftermath of accidents with the support of game theory and 
governance is discussed in [7]. The use of game theory to 
improve the planning of organizational change is dealt 
with in [8], and the use of game theory to improve the 
efficacy of governance committees in knowledge alliance 
is studied in [9]. The selected papers indicate that game 
theory could be used in similar ways to aid IT governance 
initiatives, but none of them deal with the governance of 
information technology directly. Therefore, the use of 
game theory to support IT governance is actually an open 
road for research and publication [1]. In fact, while 
involved in IT governance activities, actors are likely to 
play cooperative games. 
3. CONCEPTS 
3.1 COBIT 
ISACA [14] develops and maintains the internationally 
recognized COBIT framework, helping IT professionals 
and enterprise leaders fulfill their IT Governance 
responsibilities while delivering value to the business. 
COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and Related 
Technologies), now in its fifth edition released in April 
2012, describes a set of good practices for the board, 
executive management, and operational business and IT 
managers. It helps organizations to create value from IT by 
maximizing the benefits and minimizing the risks 
associated with IT, ensuring that IT meets the legislative 
and regulatory requirements, and achieves alignment of IT 
strategy with business goals [12].  
COBIT integrates IT governance into enterprise 
governance and covers the functions, processes and 
services across the enterprise, both internal and external. 
The COBIT 5 processes are split into governance and 
management “areas”. These 2 areas contain a total of 5 
domains and 37 processes, Governance of Enterprise 
IT[Evaluate, Direct and Monitor (EDM)] and Management 
of Enterprise IT [Align, Plan and Organise (APO) ; Build 
Acquire and Implement (BAI) ; Deliver Service and 
Support (DSS); Monitor Evaluate and Assess (MEA) ] 
[14]. 
We focus our work on the sixth process of APO domain; 
Budget and Cost management process.  
3.2 Actor Network Theory (ANT) 
The theory of translation or sociology of translation known 
as Actor Network Theory: (ANT) was developed as part of 
research on the innovation process and is rooted in a socio-
technical approach to organizations. The founders of this 
current, Akrich, Callon and Latour [23] have shown that 
successful innovation depends on the success of 
unprecedented association between multiple and different 
actors. From this association, mobilization and cooperation 
of all stakeholders will emerge a socio-technical network 
and a dynamic production that aim process efficiency and 
success. 
The second important notion of ANT is the “Actant” 
Callon and Latour borrow this concept to semiotician 
Greimas. The latter replaces the term personage by the 
term actant, that “who does or endure an act”, because it 
applies not only to humans but also to animals, objects, 
concepts. The actants may be human or non-human and 
should be treated with the same importance as required by 
the principle of symmetry. 
In order to reach a step of construction of a network, 
Callon and Latour defined an approach, inspired by 
ethnomethodology [27], which bears on a sequence of 
steps called the translation sequence. To translate is to 
“express in his own language what others say and want, to 
set up as spokesman” [3], but translate it is also, negotiate, 
perform a series of movements of all kinds and this to each 
sequence of the process, which can be defined in four main 
steps: 
1. Problematization:  
“The problematization or how to become essential?”, “The 
problematization, as its name indicates asking at first a 
problem. This is to raise awareness to a number of actors 
that are concerned by this problem, and that everyone can 
find satisfaction through a solution that translators are able 
to offer” [17], so problematization is the effort made by 
the actors to convince that they have the right solution[16]. 
It "describes a system of alliances or associations between 
entities, defining this, [their] identity and what they want" 
[18]. 
2. Interessement 
"The incentive devices or how to seal alliances", the 
incentive is in fact for Callon "all actions through which an 
entity is trying to impose and stabilize the identity of the 
other players who is defined in problematization" [17] 
incentive is the second phase, consists of "deployment 
speeches, objects and devices intended to attract and attach 
different players to the Network" [19]. 
It is building the interface between the interests of 
different actors and the strengthening of the relationship 
between these interests. In the area of strategy, it can be a 
 system of alliances to ensure that the different members of 
the organization are involved in the strategic process. 
The main thing is to translate the interests of other actors 
in order to get them to take part in the network. To 
translate the interests of others, we can either convince 
them that there are common interests and that the proposed 
solution also serves their interests or manipulate their 
interests and objectives or finally become unavoidable. 
3. Enrollment 
"How to define and coordinate the roles", Enrollment is 
"the set of multilateral negotiations, beatings forces or 
tricks that come with sharing and allow it to succeed" [17]. 
For enrollment, each actor in the network is assigned a role. 
This role is related to the translation of their interests. For 
Callon, «the enrollment is to describe the set of 
multilateral negotiations, coups or intelligence 
accompanying sharing and allow it to succeed" [18] .The 
enrollment can thus be regarded as stabilizing the system 
of alliances set during the phase of the incentive. This 
system is the result of multilateral negotiations, trials of 
strength and stratagems [18]. It is during this phase to 
confront showdowns integrating new actors to the 
networks or by strengthening links between network 
members. 
The enrollment phase is the key to the success or failure of 
innovation [18], but this phase is not studied formally in 
the literature on control. 
 
4. Mobilization 
Last phase of translation, the mobilization is to gather its 
allies. It is the cockpit of the various interests in a way that 
they remain more or less stable [20], it raises the question 
of the representation of stakeholders and enrolled in the 
project which is then established as spokespersons of the 
groups they represent [21]. However, “everyone can act 
very differently to the solution proposed: the abandon, 
accept it as it is, change the modalities which accompany 
or statement that it contains, or even they will be 
appropriated in the transferring in a completely different 
context" [18]. 
In a particular way, incentive phase of ANT can be 
analyzed from a cooperative game with transferable utility 
point of view. Our objective is to set up the network by 
incenting actors through cost savings. For that, we use 
Shapley Value to answer the question: Which coalitions 
are likely to form in order to ensure best translation of 
cost-saving objectives in an actor-network context? 
3.3 Cooperative games theory 
The cooperative game theory can be applied to the case 
where actors can achieve more benefit by cooperating than 
staying alone, it consists of two elements: (i) a set of 
players, and (ii) a characteristic function specifying the 
value created by different subsets of the players in the 
game [24]. The coalition formation problem is one of the 
important issues of game theory, both in cooperative and 
non-cooperative games. There are several attempts to 
analyze this problem. Many papers tried to find stable 
coalition structures in a cooperative game theoretic 
fashion. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition 
generates the largest total surplus, it is natural to assume 
that the grand coalition structure will eventually form after 
some negotiations [26]. Then, the worth of the grand 
coalition has to be allocated to the individual players, 
according to the contribution of each player [26]. We are 
interested in this work in cost-sharing between coalition 
members likely to form using Game theory as a device for 
ANT interessement stage. 
3.4 Cost management process in a business 
collaboration network 
A major concern of senior management is the level of the 
IT costs and their recovery. Implement a cost management 
process consists on comparing costs to budgets. 
Stakeholders are consulted to identify and control the total 
costs and benefits within the context of the IT strategic and 
tactical plans, and initiate corrective action where needed 
[30]. The process promotes partnership between the 
different actors; enables the rational use of IT resources; 
and provides transparency and accountability.  
Collaboration network has created a need for new 
management control practices. Collaborative cost 
management process is defined as buyers‟ and suppliers; 
coordinated efforts to reduce costs [15]. The theoretical 
literature on interorganizational relationship formation is 
fragmented, with several disciplines contributing to the 
field. Transaction cost economics (TCE) [26], actor 
network theory [27], industrial network approach [28], and 
structuring theory [29] are the dominant theoretical 
perspective of interorganizational setting as well as 
interorganizational cost management research.  
In this paper we focus on actor network theory approach 
and deal with cost management both as a process of IT 
governance and as a mechanism of interessement.  
4. Actor-Network building Game 
In our framework players are actors of network. To the 
extent that they may have common interests, actors are 
required to cooperate in advance to take and implement 
joint decisions, coordinate their actions and pool their 
winnings & cost. It appears a cooperative game where the 
actors come together to form coalitions, and all of whom 
seek to optimize the quality and cost of their own 
operations. They can, through cooperation, realize gains in 
the form of cost reduction. We can discuss it during the 
game in terms of the distribution of costs rather than gains. 
 This is the approach taken here. Then costs are divided 
between the players relative to their marginal contributions. 
To formalize the cost-sharing model with cooperative 
game in this coalition building process, we apply a concept 
of axiomatic solution, in this case the Shapley value.  
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players. A coalition is 
any subset of N. The set of all coalitions is denoted by 2ⁿ. 
A coalitional form concern on a finite set of players  
S{1, . . . , n} is a function v from the set of all coalitions 2ⁿ 
to the set of real numbers R with v(∅ ) = 0. v(S) represents 
the total worth the coalition S can get in the game v.  
4.1 The use of Shapley value 
The Shapley value is a very common cost-sharing 
procedure in cooperative game theory essentially based on 
the so-called incremental costs [24]. The Shapley value of 
player i in the game given by the characteristic function V 
is the share of the surplus should be assign. It‟s a weighted 
average of the contributions of player i to reach of the 
possible coalition. 
For example, consider a game with three players, i1, i2 and 
i3. Assume that player i1 is the first player of the game, i2 
is the second player to join the game and player i3 is the 
last one. Player i1 is allocated a cost C({i1}), player i2 is 
allocated a cost C({i1, i2}) − C({i1}), and player i3 a cost 
C({i1, i2, i3}) − C({i1, i2}). The Shapley value assumes 
that the order of arrival is random and the probability that 
a player joins first, second, third, etc. a coalition is the 
same for all players. Assume that forces of each coalition 
are known in the form of the characteristic function V. The 
cost allocated to a player i in a game including a set N of 
players is given by:  
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|N| and |S| respectively, the total number of players and the 
one belonging to the coalition S.  
An alternative equivalent formula for the Shapley value is: 
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Where the sum ranges over all |N| orders R of the players 
and Ri  is the set of players in N which precede i in the 
order R. 
Choosing a method of cost allocation is not an easy thing. 
According to the literature Shapley value seems to be 
suitable to this context of actor-Network building game. In 
fact, Shapley imposes four axioms to be satisfied 
(Efficiency, Symmetry, Dummy and Additivity). 
(i) Efficiency: players precisely distribute among 
themselves the resources available to the grand 
coalition. Namely, Efficiency: ∑i∈N φi(v) = v(N).  
(ii) Symmetry: Players i,j ∈  N are said to be 
symmetric with respect to game v if they make 
the same marginal contribution to any coalition, 
i.e., for each S ⊂ N with i,j ∉S, v(S ∪  i) = v(S ∪  
j). In another way if players i and j are symmetric 
with respect to game v, then φi(v) = φj(v).  
(iii) Dummy: If i is a dummy player, i.e.,         v(S ∪  
i)- v(S) = 0 for every S ⊂ N, then φi(v) = 0.  
(iv) Additivity: φ (v+w) = φ (v) +φ (w), where the 
game v+w is defined by (v+w)(S) = v(S) +w(S) 
for all S. 
The dummy, symmetry (meaning that two players have the 
same strength Strategic will receive the same gain) and 
efficiency make the Shapley value particularly attractive 
for treating the problem of equitable sharing of resources 
common to several economic agents. 
4.2 Experimental setup of cost sharing within a 
public institution with several actors  
An administration with several actors/stakeholders 
(department, partners, suppliers...) may wish to establish a 
costs management process that encourages collaborators to 
contribute to minimizing the common cost. As shown 
Shubik (1962), the allocation of common costs in the 
company can be seen as a cooperative game between 
different departments. 
To fix ideas, consider the following example with three 
directions (A, B and C) of the same department that are in 
agreement with a company to perform backup sites. The 
project amounts to 10 million for each direction taken 
separately. For technical reasons, the service provider 
offers cost (reduced) respectively 16, 17 and 18 for joint 
contracts between A and B, A and C, B and C. The 
contract involving the three directions has a cost of 24. 
The cost function is given then by: 
 
TABLE I.  TABLEAU OF COSTS 
Coalition Cost 
A  10 
B  10 
C  10  
AB  16 
AC  17  
BC  18  
ABC  24  
 
The construction of a common backup site might be more 
profitable than building smaller sites. Indeed, the three 
directions get a fair deal, and are motivated to form a 
coalition since their cost parts are below their costs of 
 going it alone. How costs should they are distributed 
among the three directions? 
This issue can be described by a three-player game,        N 
= {A, B, C} is thus obtained:  
TABLE II.  THE CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION ELEMENTS 
Coalition Gain 
A  0 
B  0 
C  0  
AB  4 
AC  3  
BC  2  
ABC  6  
 
Applying Shapley formula (1), there are six possible 
arrival orders (3!). They are listed in the following table 
which gives the marginal contributions according to each 
of them.  
For example, A(ABC) = v ({A}) - v (θ) = 0-0 = 0,  
B(ABC) = v ({AB}) - v ({A}) = 4-0 = 4, etc. 
The distribution of v (N) cost reduction according to the 
Shapley value is given by φ (v) = (2.5, 2, 1.5). In terms of 
cost sharing, the calculation is illustrated in Table III. 
 
TABLE III.  CALCULING SHAPLEY VALUE 
Entry order 
Marginal contributions 
A B C 
ABC 0 4 2 
ACB 0 3 3 
BAC 4 0 2 
BCA 4 0 2 
CAB 3 3 0 
CBA 4 2 0 
Total 15 12 9 
Shapley Value 15/6 12/6 9/6 
 
This means that about 24 million, the directions A, B and 
C have to pay 7.5; 8 and 8.5 respectively. 
5. Experimental results 
After completing this research, and in order to validate the 
approach presented in this paper, we developed a java 
platform composed of two modules; the first one allows to 
draw network as it is and design the different information 
about the actor network, the second module permits to 
calculate actors Shapely value and simulates coalitions 
costs. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Marginal Values in ABC Coalition 
 
Figure 2.  Marginal Values in ABCD Coalition 
Numerical results demonstrate that our approach 
permits to achieve very effective cost allocations, thus 
representing an efficient framework for the conception of 
stable networks. 
6. Conclusion 
The build of partnership and coalition intra and inter-
departments appears a strategic decision to reduce costs 
and achieve the submitted projects. This incentive 
approach could be introduced by the network administrator 
or the deciders makers in order to increase the users‟ 
cooperation level. The rules of sharing common costs and 
benefits of cooperation are important factors of 
competitiveness, performance, transparency and 
motivation, therefore for good governance. 
We addressed in this paper It Governance, in 
particular, the Budget and Cost Management Process from 
a cooperative game point of view. 
 The feature of this work is the use of Actor-Network 
to establish collaborative network, by inciting actors to 
choose the best coalition through cost saving applying 
Shapley values. The proposed work is supported by a 
software tool which enables to design network and 
calculate actor‟s Shapley Value. 
The main contributions of this work can therefore be 
summarized as follows: 
 Cost sharing as incentive device and formal 
support of budget and costs management process 
 Formulation of the Actor-network building 
problem as a cooperative game, where players 
(actors) cooperate to reduce costs 
 Implementation of a graphical tool in order to 
design and simulate the actor-network evolution 
based on cost calculation approach 
Apart from that, our present theoretical model still requires 
more elaboration on details, and the Shapely value that can 
be utilized to support interessement stage of ANT remains 
as a proposal in the case of budget and costs management 
process. Future work may require more empirical research 
with different types of actors and objectives. 
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